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"I thought to myself, if evil can be organized so efficiently [by the Nazis] why cannot good? Is there any reason for efficiency to be monopolized by the forces for evil in the world? Why have good people in history never seemed to have had as much power as bad people? I decided I would try to find out why and devote my life to doing something about it."
Robert S. Hartman

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JOURNAL OF FORMAL AXIOLOGY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE

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Axiology and Evil

From the Archives

Memorial Tributes to Frank G. Forrest

AXIOLOGY AND EVIL

The 2014 issue of this Journal issued the following challenge:

A SUGGESTED TOPIC FOR 2015: This Journal does not usually suggest topics for its issues, but we hope that our readers will consider and perhaps write something to be considered for possible publication in our 2015 issue on the following issue. First, read the quote from Hartman on this and every front cover. Then consider this question: "WHY is Evil Easier to Organize than Good?" Hartman clearly assumed THAT it is, but what explains this?

The following three articles address the topic of Axiology and Evil.

DOES EVIL PREVAIL OVER GOODNESS?

Clifford Hurst and Amora Rama

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Abstract

This paper reports the results of an empirical study that made use of HVP scores from six convenience samples totaling more than 1,000 respondents, to determine whether respondents' profiles as measured by the HVP support Hartman's contention that it is easier to organize for evil than for good. Our findings are that, for the samples studied, respondents' scores do not support Hartman's assertion. We found a strong prevalence for the "good" rather than for evil across all six data samples using the HVP scales we analyzed.

In his autobiography, *Freedom to Live*, Hartman described the personal journey that led him to devote his adult life to developing and refining the theory of formal axiology. He notes that during

a particularly difficult time—it was 1933—he knew he must decide whether to stay in Germany or to flee the evil of the Third Reich. He wrote:

> Here in Hitler's Germany, I concluded, is the very core of evil. Already he has taken over Germany. Something must be done to prevent him from taking over and poisoning the minds of all mankind.
>
> I thought to myself, if evil can be organized so efficiently, why cannot good? Is there any reason for efficiency to be monopolized by the forces for evil in the world? Why is it so difficult to organize good? Why have good people in history never seemed to have had as much power as bad people? I decided I would try to find out why and devote my life to doing something about it. (32-33)

Hartman at that moment resolved to leave the country of his birth for the reason, as he wrote, "In Nazi Germany I was a marked man and could do little or nothing" (33).

The Editor of this themed issue of the *Journal of Formal Axiology* challenged contributors to engage, as Hartman did, with these questions. Is Hartman right in concluding that it is easier for humankind to organize for evil than for good? If so, why? If not, why not?

The study of good and evil is a broad topic, and an age-old one. The topic of evil is addressed at length by Acquaviva and Ellis in their articles in this same issue. North, also in this issue, focus attention on one aspect of goodness, congruence between one's inner and outer selves. In this article, we aim to fill in some of the gaps not addressed by these other contributors. In particular, we will focus attention on reporting empirically the habitual evaluative thought patterns of more than 1,000 people from six convenience samples to identify whether, indeed, these respondents exhibit tendencies to organize cognitively for evil or for good.

1. Constraints of our Study

It is our specific intention to reduce the conversational barriers between the theory of formal axiology, as expressed in words, and its foremost semiotic representation in terms of the hierarchy of values and valuations that are measured by the scales of the *Hartman Value Profile* (HVP). Doing so dictates that, for purposes of this essay, we constrain ourselves to that framework of the binomial structure of values and valuations as they are used in the construct and interpretation of the HVP. Third, fourth, and fifth order value combinations are certainly possible and may shed light on the subject of good and evil, but empirical tests of third and higher levels of combinations of values have not been developed. Thus, statistical analysis of such higher-order combinations is not possible today. So, this is not an arbitrary constraint; it is a purposeful one. One benefit of limiting our analysis to the use of the quantitative scales of the HVP is expressed by Hartman, "It is characteristic of mathematics to be both highly abstract and profoundly concrete; and it is this that gives it its efficiency in actual life" (1967, 29).

We will strive, whenever possible, to keep our terminology congruent with the *Manual of Interpretation* (Hartman, 2006). Doing so, we hope, will provide a common language by which a reader knowledgeable of the *Manual* can investigate, argue, or dispute our reasoning. This is often difficult, as axiologists have frequently expressed their findings from the HVP in divergent ways. Whenever we do differ from terminology of the *Manual*, we will explain the source and rationale for our usage.

2. An Introduction to Axiological Semiotics of the HVP

We offer this section as an aid to the reader who may not yet be knowledgeable of the logic behind the construction of the HVP. According to the axioms of value, there are eighteen possible binary combinations of value and valuation of Hartman's three categories of value concepts, the Intrinsic (I) , Extrinsic (E), and Systemic(S). In order of best to worst, (left to right) they are shown below:

$$I^I, E^I, S^I, I^E, I^S, E^E, E^S, S^E, S^S, S_S, E_S, S_E, E_E, I_S, I_E, S_I, E_I, I_I$$

The base letter in this shorthand represents the object of value. The superscript or subscript denotes the method of valuing used by the valuing subject. Notice the importance of theI dimension in establishing this hierarchy of values and valuations. Intrinsic valuations (the I superscript) contribute more to the richness of a binary value combination than do any of the other base constructs. Second, the base I contributes more to richness than do the other two dimensions of valuation. Next in compositional importance comes the E, followed by the S. Compositional order, indicated by superscripts, is mirrored in the transpositional order, indicated by subscripts. Such annotations have become widely used among axiologists as a sort of shorthand, and they will be followed in this article. Subscripts are sometimes written by axiologists as *sub* as in *E-sub-S*. And superscripts are written as *super* as in *E-super-S*. This can become confusing because, in other contexts, when writing of over-valuation and under-valuation of each dimension, scores that refer to labels such as *valence, bias, or emotional balance*, the same verbal construct is sometimes used to express over- or under-valuation, such as *DimE* – or *DimE sub*.

In the profile, respondents are asked to sort a list of 18 words or phrases and to do so twice. The first set of 18 refer to how the respondent sees the world. Scores of a respondent's world-view are often referred to as Part 1, or are simply designated as *1* as in *DimE1*. The second set refers to how the respondent sees himself or herself. Scores of a respondent's self-view are often referred to as Part 2, or are simply designated as *2* as in *DimE2*.

This hierarchy of values in world-view, self-view, and comparisons of the two, reveals the underlying cognitive structure by which respondents to the HVP make value judgments. Its precise ordering of the hierarchy is what gives credence to Hartman's claim that formal axiology is a formal science of value. For the reader interested in understanding the logic that establishes this order and the ongoing debates among axiologists as to the exact nature of this logic, see previous issues of this *Journal*, and also Hartman (1967), Edwards (1995), and Forrest (1994, 2001). The fixed nature of this hierarchy of value gives the HVP its claim to be a deductive, as contrasted to an inductive, assessment. A person's own scores are calculated by comparing them to a theoretical ideal, but not as compared to some type of large sample norm, as is commonly done in inductive assessments of personality. Thus, if only one person in the world had ever taken the HVP, that person's scores would be validly interpretable. Of course, further empirical validation can be done by statistically analyzing large samples of norms through empirical studies, as has been done by Pomeroy (2005), and in this issue of the *Journal*, by Acquaviva and North. Our goal in this paper is to contribute further to the advancement of empirical validation of uses of the HVP.

3. Research Methods

To conduct an empirical inquiry into the validity of Hartman's concern that evil tends to prevail, we analyzed HVP scores from six different samples, ranging in size from 26 to 500 each, for a total of slightly more than 1,000 respondents. We analyzed the RHO scores and Dis scores of each group. We compared respondents' average Dim I and Dim S scores, as well as their tendencies to over-value or under-value the I and S dimensions. We analyzed respondents' AI% scores. For each of these scales, we conducted analyses for both Parts 1 and 2, reflecting the world-views and self-views of respondents. We explain our reasons for focusing on these scales in the paragraphs that follow. If evaluative proclivities towards evil do, in fact, prevail within our society, we expected this empirical analysis to provide supporting evidence of the prevalence of such proclivities in some of these scales or in some combination of these scales of the HVP.

To keep the scope of our current project manageable, we have limited the scope of our analysis to focus only on those standard HVP scales that Hartman indicated in his autobiography would be most likely in evidence if proclivities towards evil were widespread. Acquaviva and North, in this issue, show how the development of custom scales derived from standard HVP scores may provide additional insight that standard scales, alone, cannot produce.

4. Results

In this section, we report the results from our findings of our analyses of these selected scales from the HVP. We report our results in table format and also describe them verbally. Calculations of descriptive statistics of frequencies were done using IBM's SPSS Statistics version 22.

RHO Scores

Hartman supposes that most people who respond to the HVP will score within 85% to 90% of the theoretical norm of formal axiology (Hartman, 1995, 122). He goes on to say that this gives credence to the theoretical validity of the construct of the instrument. As a consequence of Hartman's assumption, we posit that if such an overwhelming majority of people's value structures are this closely in alignment with the theory of formal axiology, it would be disingenuous to argue that it is more common to be evil than to be good. One way to test empirically whether most respondents score 85% to 90% in alignment with the theory of formal axiology is to analyze the mean and median Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients from multiple samples of data. Spearman's coefficient is usually abbreviated as a RHO Score. RHO Scores can range from -1.0 to +1.0. Therefore, a RHO score of, say, +0.70 is 85% is in alignment with the theoretical norm of formal axiology. A RHO score of +.80 is 90% is in alignment, and a +.90 is 95% in alignment. The HVP reports RHO scores for the respondent's world-view in Part 1 and the respondent's self-view in Part 2. Since the theory of formal axiology is a theory of good, then close alignment by a large sample of respondents should reveal the tendency towards good. A lack of alignment would support Hartman's assertion that evil tends to prevail. This led us to the first question we aim to answer in this paper:

> *Question One:* Do the RHO scores from samples of six sets of data indicate that respondents' scores are closely aligned with the theory of formal axiology or not?

Table 1 shows the mean and median RHO 1 and RHO 2 scores for 6 datasets we have been able to analyze, as well as the number (N) of respondents in each data set. Hartman wrote that "in any large enough group the scores follow the normal frequency curve" (2006, 42). We have analyzed each of these data sets visually, and have applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality to them. We found that they frequently fail to be sufficiently normally distributed to give us confidence in using the mean as the best measure of central tendency. Therefore, we report here both mean and median scores.

Table 1. RHO Scores

Category	**N**	**RHO 1**		**RHO 2**	
		Mean	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**
College freshmen or sophomores	26	.875	.898	.775	.844
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	.889	.898	.846	.865
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	.912	.924	.855	.867
Senior managers	103	.861	.875	.862	.870
Community leaders	45	.907	.914	.877	.880
Community leaders	303	.902	.902	.852	.868

The noticeably high levels of congruence between these RHO scores and the norm of the theory of formal axiology leads us to conclude that, at least for the sorts of populations represented in these data sets, people are much more cognitively organized for good than for evil. This conclusion does not support Hartman's assertion in his autobiography, which prompted this special topic in this issue of this *Journal*.

Distortions of Value

Of all the indices measured by the HVP, the construct of the Dissimilarity (or Distortion) scores is, perhaps, the most straightforward. This scale is often abbreviated as the Dis score. Since, in each set of 18 words and phrases, 9 are positive and are called "compositions," and 9 are negative and are called "transpositions," the Dis score simply counts the number of times that a respondent ranks something that is axiologically a transposition as a composition or a composition as a transposition. In other words, it is a count of how many times the respondent rates something good as bad or something bad as good. Because it is a forced choice instrument, this happens in pairs. So, Distortion scores are always even numbers. A zero score means that there was no distortion. A score of 2 indicates that the respondent ranked one bad word or phrase as good and, hence, one good word or phrase as bad. A Dis score of 4 indicates that two pairs were treated in this manner, and so forth. The verbal rating assigned by Hartman in the *Manual* to the Distortion score is: 0 = *Excellent*; 2 = *Good*, 4 = *Average*, 6 = *Very Poor*, and ≥8 = *Extremely Poor*. A completely inverted score, where every composition was ranked as a transposition and every transposition as a composition, would have a Dis score of 18.

Illustration 1 gives examples of the ordering of one part of the profile, first with no distortion, then with two distortions, and finally, with six distortions. In this illustration, distortions are italicized and shown in red.

Illustration 1.

$I^I, E^I, S^I, I^E, I^S, E^E, E^S, S^E, S^S, S_S, E_S, S_E, E_E, I_S, I_E, S_I, E_I, I_I$
Rank ordering with no Distortions

$I^I, E^I, S^I, I^E, S_E\ I^S, E^E, E^S, S^E, S^S, S_S, E_S, I^S, E_E, I_S, I_E, S_I, E_I, I_I$
Rank ordering with two Distortions

$I_I, E^I, S^I, I^E, S_E, E^E, E^S, S^{E,}\ S_I, S_S, E_S, I^S, E_E, I_S, I_E, S^S, E_I, I^I$
Rank ordering with six Distortions

From this understanding of the Distortion score, it would appear intuitively obvious that a person whose world view is reflected by ranking slavery, blowing up airliners in flight, and torturing innocent people as good things, and babies, wedding rings, and love as nature all as bad things, may have such a distorted view of the world that it would be appropriate to conclude that this person is inclined towards evil. A person with such a large Dis score caused by these mis-ranked elements (in this instance, a Dis1 score of ≥6) may be the classical sociopath of which Ellis writes.

However, is a Dis1 score of ≥6 enough to label a person as inclined towards evil? Not necessarily. What about the respondent who ranks a uniform, an assembly line, and a technical improvement as bad and nonsense, a fine, and a short-circuit as good? Such a person would also have a Dis1 score of 6. Yet, the distortions in judgment that are reflected by these rankings hardly seem deserving of the label evil. So, we must avoid jumping to conclusions about a score from a single scale on the HVP. The various dimension scores and integration scores, at the very least, must also be taken into account in order to distinguish degrees of badness between the two make-believe respondents described above. These distinctions appear in the various Dimension scales, but not in the Dis scale. Distortions of I-related phrases are, by definition, larger distortions than are those of E- or S-related phrases. Therefore, I-related distortions, which indicate lack of empathy, are worse than E-related ones, which are worse than S-related ones. This is why some axiologists separate out and report the distortions within each value dimension in addition to reporting the total Dis score. Scoring instructions in the *Manual of Interpretation* do not specify that this be done, but Hartman does mention the benefits of doing so. On page 55 of the *Manual*, he refers to these Dis scales as Dimensional Dissimilarity scores. The computerized-scoring form that we use in our research is the Byrum Method, provided by HVP Insights. It does not calculate Dis scores for each dimension, only in the aggregate, so we are unable to report on distortion scores per dimension of value in this paper. Our second question, consequently, relates to Dis scores.

> *Question Two*: Do the average Dis scores of six sets of data indicate that respondents' exhibit a large amount of value distortion in their judgment of right and wrong?

Table 2 shows the count of Dis scores of 0,2,4,6, 8, 10, and 12 and the percentage of respondents whose scores fall into each category for six different data sets of respondents to the HVP, according to various occupational categories.

Table 2.a Distortion Part 1 Scores

Category	**N**	**Distortion Scores Part 1**						
		0	**2**	**4**	**6**	**8**	**10**	**12**
College freshmen or sophomores	26	8	14	4	0	0	0	0
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	35	27	12	0	0	0	0
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	345	135	16	3	0	1	0
Senior managers	103	43	54	6	0	0	0	0
Community leaders	45	25	19	1	0	0	0	0
Community leaders	303	204	77	18	1	2	1	0
Total Number	1051	660	326	57	4	2	2	0
Percentage		**63%**	**31%**	**5%**	**.4%**	**.2%**	**.2%**	**0%**

Table 2.b Distortion Part 2 Scores

Category	**N**	**Distortion Scores Part 2**						
		0	2	4	6	8	10	12
College freshmen or sophomores	26	12	7	4	1	1	0	1
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	56	13	2	3	0	0	0
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	429	58	11	2	0	0	0
Senior managers	103	82	19	2	0	0	0	0
Community leaders	45	39	6	0	0	0	0	0
Community leaders	303	259	26	13	2	2	1	0
Total Number	1051	877	129	32	8	3	1	1
Percentage		**83%**	**12%**	**3%**	**.8%**	**.3%**	**.1%**	**.1%**

A review of Table 2 reveals that very poor distortion scores (6 or higher) are rare, indeed. Notice that, in these data sets, only 0.8% of respondents' world-view scores, and only 1.3% of self-view scores show a very poor or extremely poor rating. Not one respondent, out of 1051, earned a Dis score of >12. Only one person out of a thousand scored a 12 and three out of a thousand scored a 10 in either part of the test. It would appear, therefore, from these data, that the prevalence of large amounts of valuational distortion among respondents is quite small, indeed. This again, argues against Hartman's conclusion that it is easier to organize for evil than for good.

Intrinsic vs. Systemic Valuations

It is in his autobiography (1994) that Hartman argues most stridently that it is easier to organize for evil than for good. In that text, he does not describe his assertions specifically in terms of the HVP, but he does describe his reasoning using the general terminology of the theory of formal axiology. The essence of his argument, frequently repeated throughout his Chapter Five, is that war, defined by Hartman as organized evil, comes from a tendency to over-value systemic values at the cost of intrinsic values (33, 161, 165). He writes of the error of embracing Aristotelian thought over the message of Jesus. "It was Aristotle, who, 300 years before Christ, channeled human thought into the dangerous current in which Christian love was to drown—the overvaluation of systems or thought patterns and the undervaluation of human life" (167).

Hartman's terminology prompted us to examine respondents' Intrinsic Dimension scores (Dim I) relative to their Systemic dimension scores (Dim S) in both part 1 and part 2. This brings us to our third question.

Question Three: Do the respondents whose HVP scores we have analyzed in our research samples tend to have more strongly developed Dim S scores than they do Dim I scores in either Part 1 or Part 2 of the profile? If so, how big of a gap is required to be large enough to signify a likelihood to make value judgments in favor of systemic constructs at the detriment of the individuality of people?

Once again, for the samples sizes we are dealing with, the distribution of Dimension scores tends to be skewed; hence, we are reporting both the mean and median score of each.
Notice that, in Table 3, Dimension scores are shown in a manner that is in accordance with the *Manual of Interpretation*. That is, lower-numbered scores are stronger (that is better, or more axiologically sound), than are higher-numbered scores. Dimension scores reflect the amount of deviation in a person's responses from the theoretical norm of formal axiology for each of the I, E, and S dimensions. Here we analyze only the intrinsic and systemic scores, as these were the focus of Hartman's attention in his autobiography. Ellis, in his article in this issue, makes the case that over-valuation of the Extrinsic at the expense of the Intrinsic can also lead to evil. Hartman mentions the same in the *Manual*, but he then emphasizes, "Very often… axiological astigmatism is due to systemicness. This overvaluation of systems is an ancient fallacy of human judgment" (234).

Table 3. Comparison of DimI and DimS Scores

		Part 1				**Part 2**			
Category	N	**DimI**		**DimS**		**DimI**		**DimS**	
		Mean	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**
College freshmen or sophomores	26	10.85	10	13.23	11.5	14.27	12	15.96	15
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	10.45	10	12.95	12.5	12.57	12	13.51	13
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	8.32	8	12.58	12	11.69	11	13.47	13
Senior managers	103	10.25	10	14.44	14	10.26	10	13.31	13
Community leaders	45	8.42	8	13.49	13	10.29	10	12.36	12
Community leaders	303	8.73	8	12.89	12	11.57	11	13.60	14

Whether you compare the mean scores or the median scores, you will note that for each of the six sets of data, participants average Dim I Scores are stronger (i.e., lower) than are their Dim S scores. This is true for both Part 1 and Part 2. Participants in each sample also tend to have somewhat more strongly developed world-views than they do self-views. From the *Manual of Interpretation* (52) we see that the median Dim I Part 1 scores in the above samples range from *Good* to *Very Good*, while median Dim S Part 1 scores fall into the *Average* range. In Part 2, median Dim I scores are in the *Average* to *Good* ranges, while median Dim S scores are all in the *Average* range. In each of the six samples analyzed, respondents showed stronger development of intrinsic values than they do systemic values.

These samples, drawn from a convenience sample of professions, largely in the United States, in the first decades of the 21st century, do not support Hartman's conclusions that systemic valuation prevails over intrinsic valuation in terms of the strength of judgment of these two modes of valuing.

Over-Valuations and Under-Valuations

Hartman writes regularly in the *Manual of Interpretation* (44,234) about over-valuing and under-valuing each of the I, E, and S dimensions. He often refers metaphorically to such tendencies as "axiological strabism" that are a component of "axiological astigmatism," which together lead to poor "value vision" (2006). In particular, he describes the sort of evil that is exemplified by the modern militaristic nation-state as deriving from people's tendencies to over-value the systemic while under-valuing the intrinsic dimension. How does an interpretation of HVP results help us in understanding the prevalence of this tendency? Two different scales of the HVP measure these tendencies towards under- or over-valuation.

AI%

In his instructions for manually scoring the HVP, Hartman instructs the scorer to tally the number of under-valuations and the number of over-valuations of each dimension, placing the totals in columns that are not labelled, but simply are marked "+" or "-". The positives are summed and the negatives are summed. Then, the negative result is divided into the DIF score to yield the AI% score. In this part of the *Manual*, Hartman writes: "The A.I. percentage shows the positive or negative attitude of the testee toward the world or toward himself…The Attitude Index is a result of the testee's over-or undervaluing the test items" (60). Only the sum of the negative attitude scores is used to calculate the AI%. This description of AI% led us to ask a fourth question.

> *Question Four:* Do the AI% scores of our samples of HVP respondents indicate such a negative attitude toward the world or toward oneself that this may be a sign of proclivities towards the prevalence of evil?

Our findings appear in Table 4.

Table 4. AI% Scores

		Part 1		**Part 2**	
Category	**N**	**AI% Score**		**AI% Score**	
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median
College freshmen or sophomores	26	57.42	58	59.23	52.5
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	55.96	53.5	52.62	50
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	52.83	50	51.44	50
Senior managers	103	55.70	54	52.00	50
Community leaders	45	53.44	50	50.60	50
Community leaders	303	53.41	50	51.98	50

Verbal descriptions of AI% scores are found in page 60-B of the Manual. Scores of 50-53 are *Excellent*; 54-57 are *Very Good*, and 58-61 are *Good*. Median scores in Part 1 for 4 of the 6 samples in our data are *Excellent*, one set is *Very Good*, and the college students' scores average a rating of *Good*. In Part 2, these all are in the *Excellent* range. Once again, results of our empirical analysis do not support Hartman's assertion that it is difficult to organize for good.

Supervaluations and Subvaluations

Hartman does not make reference to over-valuations or under-valuations of each Dimension in the instructions for scoring the HVP. Only later in the *Manual*, when he describes how to interpret the

Axiogram, does Hartman elaborate on the importance of over-valuation and under-valuation in each of the three dimensions. In this part of the *Manual*, he refers to them as super-valuation and sub-valuation (123-126). A careful reading of these pages is warranted for any axiologist who wants to understand the importance of over-valuations and under-valuations. Hartman summarizes: "Clinically, subvaluation means lack of development of the capacity in question while supervaluation means over compensation: the capacity is overemphasized in order to overcompensate for some lack" (126).

Hartman describes the method for calculating a person's net sub- or super-valuation of each Dimension in pages 123-126 of the *Manual*. He goes on to express this number as a percentage of the corresponding Dimension score. But, he does not provide a verbal scale by which to describe a person's tendencies towards over- or under-valuation. Because of the importance of sub- and super-valuations, however, many Axiological Service Providers who have computerized their scoring models refer separately to the super-valuations and sub-valuations of each Dimension in their reports. The authors of this paper make use of Byrum's method, which speaks of these tendencies as *emotional balance*. Other Axiological Service Providers refer to these as *biases, emotional biases, or valences*. In Table 5, we follow Byrum's method, which indicates a balanced score as falling between -5 and +5, with 0 being perfectly balanced. Such scores Byrum labels as *Strong Capacity*. Between -6 to -14 or +6 to +14 Byrum states that there may be an issue to be noted that is, at least, worthy of discussion. Scores in this range are labelled as *Moderate*. And if a Dimension's balance score is -15 or greater or +15 or greater, then this may present a challenge to the individual. Scores in this range are labelled as *Less Strong*.

This leads us to our fifth research question.

> *Question Five:* Do the sample of respondents whose HVP scores we have analyzed tend to over-value the Systemic dimension in either part 1 or 2 and/or to under-value the Intrinsic in either part 1 or 2? If so, how big of a gap is required to be large enough to signify a likelihood to demonstrably over-value the systemic dimension to the detriment of the individuality of people?

When it comes to these respondents' emotional balance towards these dimensions, what do the ranges and the averages of these respondents scores tell us? Ranges from our data sets are shown in Table 5. Given the nature of this scale, measures of central tendency, both the mean and the median, tend towards a middle or balanced score. Therefore, we also show in Table 5 the minimum and maximum scores for these scales. Table 6 shows the percentage of those individuals whose scores in any of these four balance dimensions are greater than -14 or +14.

Table 5a. Over- and Under-Valuations of I and S Dimensions Part 1

		Part 1							
Category	**N**	**Balance of Intrinsic**				**Balance of Systemic**			
		Mean	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**
College freshmen or sophomores	26	-2.62	-2	-11	+4	-0.92	-1	-10	+7
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	-3.12	-1.50	-25	+5	+1.43	+2	-9	+11
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	-0.39	0	-20	+7	+0.89	+1	-44	+16
Senior managers	103	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Community leaders	45	+0.24	+1	-12	+5	+0.56	+1	-8	+16
Community leaders	303	-0.74	0	-31	+7	+0.69	+1	-38	+12

Table 5b. Over-and Under-Valuations if I and S Dimensions Part 2

		Part 2							
Category	**N**	**Balance of Intrinsic**				**Balance of Systemic**			
		Mean	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**Median**	**Min**	**Max**
College freshmen or sophomores	26	-11.3	-8	-50	+1	+3.65	+5	-16	+16
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	-8.43	-7.5	-23	+2	+7.30	+8.5	-15	+18
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	-7.27	-7	-25	+6	+7.95	+8	-21	+24
Senior managers	103	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Community leaders	45	-4.82	-4	-15	+3	+5.33	+6	-8	+19
Community leaders	303	-7.18	-7	-49	+5	+7.81	+8	-25	+21

*Due to differences in method of computerized scoring by the axiologist who provided us with scores for 103 senior managers, we are unable to convert the balance scores for that data set to the scales used for the other 4 sets of data.

Analysis of Table 5 indicates a slight tendency for respondents in these data sets to substantially negatively under-value the intrinsic worth of others and to positively over-value their systems view of the world. Also, this same tendency to under-value the intrinsic worth of oneself and to over-value the systemic dimension of oneself is evident. In Table 6, we note the percentage of respondents from each data set whose Balance scores are extreme. We define extreme as being a number larger than -14, which reflects an extreme under-valuation, or as a number larger than +14, which depicts an extreme over-valuation.

Table 6. Percentages of Extreme Balance Scores

	Extreme Balance Scores (Expressed as % of respondents whose scores > -14 or >+14 for each data set)								
Category	**N**	**Part 1**				**Part 2**			
		Bal Intrinsic		**Bal Systemic**		**Bal Intrinsic**		**Bal Systemic**	
Extreme Under or Over-valuation		-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
College freshmen or sophomores	26	0%	0%	0%	0%	26.9%	0%	3.8%	7.7%
Early-stage entrepreneurs	74	4.1%	0%	0%	0%	9.5%	0%	1.4%	16.2%
Healthcare professionals/managers	500	0.6%	0%	0.4%	0.2%	7.4%	0%	0.6%	18.0%
Senior managers	103	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Community leaders	45	0%	0%	0%	2.2%	2.2%	0%	0%	13.3%
Community leaders	303	1.7%	0%	0.7%	0%	5.9%	0%	0.7%	13.2%

As can be seen, this table reveals that between 8% and 18% of the respondents in our data sets have extreme over-valuations of the Systemic Part 2. Extreme over-valuations in Part 1, however, would appear to be more indicative of what Hartman speaks of when he discusses the contemporary nation-state and its tendency to militarize. In the samples of respondents used in this research, three of the samples included no participants who extremely over-valued the Systemic in Part 1 and one sample had only 0.2% of respondents, while another had 2.2% of respondents who extremely over-valued the Systemic in Part 1. We surmise that over-valuations of the Systemic in Part 1 are what Hartman had in mind as "evil," and if the above samples are representative of U.S. society as a whole, then we could conclude that this valuational tendency towards systemic over-valuation of the world exists in less than 2% of the population.

These samples from which our data are drawn may not be representative of the population, and they also may not be representative of groups within the population that are most subjected to systems that favor over-valuing of the systemic, as Ellis mentions in his article in this issue of the *Journal*. If other axiologists have HVP data from politicians, military personnel, police officers, or prison guards, it would be very interesting to see whether professionals in those careers tend to have systemic over-valuations in Part 1. If they show a substantially larger percentage of over-valuers of the systemic dimension in Part 1, it would lend credence to Hartman's argument that it is easier to organize for evil than for good. The evidence presented in this paper does not warrant support for Hartman's argument.

5. Conclusion

We have sought in this article to relate Hartman's concerns about the ease by which civilizations can organize for evil to specific measures of the HVP. To do so, we analyzed six different samples of respondents, totaling slightly more than 1,000 people, to reveal, in terms of various HVP scales, whether deep-seated evaluative thought patterns of these respondents tend to reveal propensities toward evil or toward good. In none of the HVP measures we analyzed did tendencies towards evil

predominate within the value structures of our samples of respondents. Future analyses of data from career politicians, military personnel, police officers, and prison guards, or other careers where anecdotal empirical evidence that over-valuing of the systemic dimension occurs would shed additional light on this matter.

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